Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.
Moreover, Mason and Dixon furnish the occasion for ingeniously inventive storytelling, for their exploits while creating their famous Line give Pynchon an almost unlimited (and unbridled) opportunity to assess America prior to its revolution.
5 As Charles Clerc notes, "The number of historical facts that accumulate in the novel indeed becomes surprising. Even while we are aware of reading re-imagined or recreated history, we suspect that most bases may prove at least partially factual" (48). Pynchon seems to know that contemporary readers cannot rely on only one version of history if they wish to adhere to contemporary ethics of reading, but must remain open to how other writers, including fiction writers, interpret history to keep history alive. It is in this spirit that I link Pynchon with Kant in suggesting that the history in Mason & Dixon incorporates a philosophy of morals and the judgment that the early nation lacked a clearly defined moral structure.
But in working toward an explication of Kant, I will also discuss other theoretical issues. Critics of the novel have seized upon Pynchon's exploration of reason and rational discourse. Clerc, for instance, writes,
The deficiencies in human nature show up especially against the ironic backdrop of progress in the Age of Reason. A triumph of the 18th century is its beginning advances in science, seen in the accomplishments of men like Mason, Bradley, Maskelyne, Franklin. (But if progress, why so much stupidity and irrationality?) (101 I Pynchon's novel represents a type of historical writing that historians typically shun for a more sterile, journalistic (that is, supposedly objective) version of history. The novel, furthermore, seems to adhere to Benjamin's eighteenth thesis, part A, in which he writes, Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one. Thus he establishes a conception of the present as "the time of the now" which is shot through with chips of Messianic time. (263) audience, by following the exploits of Mason and Dixon, to make sweeping connections between an often-overlooked historical episode and various other points of history. The title of the novel's first section, "Latitudes and Departures," signals both the literal travel awaiting Mason and Dixon and the departures Pynchon will take, with a considerable degree of latitude, from rigid conventional history (Benjamin's rosary beads) .
Pynchon also draws upon notions of the public sphere in relation to the Age of Reason. Jurgen Habermas, in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, identifies the public sphere as that public place, such as a coffeehouse, where people-mostly property owners-came together to share rational discourse:
6
[As early as the thirteenth century, citizens) claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate ov er the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason. (27) Communication is the key to this rational discourse, and Habermas discusses how reason (debate, for example) became critical in the public sphere, for it did not appear (in theory, of course) until private people had "come together as a public" (27). Habermas refers to both seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Britain as "model easels]" of the development of a political public sphere, in that a "modern parliament" emerged from the "assembly of estates" (57). By law, this "constitutional state" decreed the rights of the public sphere, giving rise to three ideas: 1 l freedom of speech; 2) freedom of the human being; and 3) freedom for private-property owners to have protection and equality (83). In coffeehouses, taverns and other public meeting-places, the public came together, and rational discourse arose. The public sphere also became crucial, Habermas observes, to those wanting to manipulate public rational discourse for political ends. Ideally, public-sphere meeting places offered people a chance to gather and share ideas without government interference. In Civil Tongues & Polite Letters in British America, David S. Shields argues that the coffeehouse advanced the liberty of expression beyond personal expressions of jest, ridicule, parody, gossip, scandal, giving voice to a sensus communis articulating social appetites and passions ... [and] Pynchon does not construct an alternative history to that of the real Mason and Dixon and their Line so much as, in broad yet succinct strokes, he fills in the gaps of history by showing readers various incidents that might have happened not only during the creation of the Line but also during America's so-called Age of Reason. Michael Schudson argues that for Habermas's public sphere to work, "not only does participation need to be widespread, but it must be rational" ( 14 7). Thus, when he concludes that "rational-critical discussion" ( 160) did not permeate colonial America as theorists often ideally surmise, he presents a perspective for readers of Mason & Dixon. In the course of the novel, Mason and Dixon begin to realize that their Line will serve as the division between North and South, and, more important, between free and slave provinces. They wonder how a nation in an Age of Reason can rely so heavily on both slavery and Indian eradication.
9
We can also assess Mason and Dixon as case studies of how Kant's philosophy might work, especially considering them as potential "misologists." Kant writes, the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of miso/ogy, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive ... even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a lux ury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness .. .. Using a discussion of Indian/white relations to segue into his dominant theme of slavery in America displays Pynchon's attention to historical detail. The very notion that white Americans began eradicating Indians to conquer the land and held slaves in bondage to help manage the land would seem to negate any sense of rational behavior. ,Furthermore, these processes of elimination and control suggest that "rational" discourse often takes the form of rationalization-political arguments as excuses meant to justify such atrocities.
Later, nearing the finish of the Line, Mason suggests that they can rationally persuade the Indians blocking their path to move by letting them look at and through the surveying instruments. Despite his occasional protests against the lack of rationality he and Dixon encounter in their voyages, here Mason falls back on the flimsiest reasoning to persuade the Indians to move. A frustrated Dixon corrects him, telling him what the Indians really want:
"They want to know how to stop this great invisible Thing that comes Mason's attitude here is symptomatic of American politics then and now. Whereas Mason suggests distracting the Indians with "Magick" -like the old wink-wink policy of using trinkets, or worse, liquor -Dixon has tuned into something more compelling. Mason's flippancy is akin to the irrationality of America, and Dixon's response foreshadows what will become his deontological bent. Mason often makes discerning comments about the atrocities they see, but he never really lets his emotions or his ethical sense move him beyond observation. Dixon's frustration grows out of his helplessness to do anything about the absurdities-and worse -he witnesses, thus giving rise to what will become his pursuit of a good in a land seemingly devoid of such pure pursuits. Mason, by not thinking through the possible repercussions of his behavior, violates the Kantian virtue of volition by making a careless choice, a choice Dixon confronts because he sees that it can possess no good in itself. In this instance, both men exhibit traces of misology: Mason's disregard for reason in dealing with the Indians and Dixon's realization that reason is probably not going to help in this situation.
Pynchon couples the ideas of westward expansion and Indian eradication to make a sweeping comment on American policy toward the indigenous inhabitants of the land. Philadelphia is "'selling rifles to anyone with the Price, most egregiously the Indians who desire our dissolution,"' while " [b] oys old enough to handle a Rifle are drilling out in Back [of the coffeehouse)" (309). War, not rationality-or worse, war as rationality-has often dominated as the true form of American Reason throughout our history. Young men-"boys, " in many cases eradicate the Indians; nearly eradicate themselves a century later; a century after that, eradicate scores of thousands of Vietnamese (not to mention the loss of 58,000 American troops); a generation later, eradicate tens of thousands of Iraqis -all in the name of a country that more than two centuries ago devoted itself to rational discourse. What does this say about American politics and democracy itself? When Dixon asks Mason, "'Is this what America's going to be like?'" (31 1), he captures the essence of what, in reality, America has become: a country with a political system that, for example, continually rationalizes. war, for better (the Second World War) or worse (Vietnam) . Pynchon also segues into other arguments regarding America then and now through Mason and Dixon's fear that their Line will serve an even more sinister purpose. Dixon tells Mason, "'We are Fools[ .... ] We shouldn't be runnin' this Line[ .. .. S]omething invisible's going on, tha must feel it, smell it ... ?"' Mason responds, "' American Politics,"' and Dixon affirms, '" Just so. We're being us' d again"' (4 78).
Dixon's frustration mounts because he realizes that, to the party using him,· his creating the Line means more than settling a simple boundary dispute: that he is an inadvertent accomplice in atrocities. His insight later reveals that he knows the Line will separate North from South, but the sheer fact that he senses this indicates that he has begun to tune in to pursuing a good even while he remains involved in an act which has the negative repercussions of marking off the slave states. In time, he will confront a choice that tests the virtue of his volition. More interesting, Dixon becomes a symbol of what it means to be an American -to live and work in a land of irrationality that boasts of nothing but its rationality. That so many Americans -then, and even more frighteningly now-conduct their business oblivious of the obvious wrongs going on all around them stimulates in a bewildered Dixon a hunger to pursue good.
That Mason and Dixon are being used becomes even more blatant in a public (house) discussion, at The Rabbi of Prague, when a patron declares, "[T)his Age sees a corruption and disabling of the ancient Magick. Projectors, Brokers of Capital, lnsurancers, Peddlers upon the global Scale, Enterprisers and Quacks, -these are the last poor fallen and feckless inheritors of a Knowledge they can never use, but in the service of Greed. The coming Rebellion is theirs, -Franklin, and that Lot,-and Heaven help the rest of us, if they prevail." With its coming revolution steeped in-for one thing -the affairs of the bourgeoisie who will become elected officials after the Revolution, America in the Age of Reason is on the verge of becoming the capitalist machine we know today. But by linking "Brokers of Capital," "Peddlers upon the global Scale" and "Quacks," Pynchon identifies American capitalism as less than rational, especially given the human atrocities strange that rational discourse could not (and still does not) exist without acknowledging religion to some degree?
Even stranger is a touch that might seem irrational to readers for whom history includes such virtuous mythic figures as the George Washington who could not tell a lie. Pynchon has the future first president ask his black Jewish slave, Gershom, to fetch him some hemp -and some (no doubt alcoholic) punch-and the four of them get stoned and discuss, among other things, Plato's Republic, while Martha (self-styled "' Agent of Domesticity unrelenting, the wife'" (280)) serves them pastries. If comic hyperbole (or appropriate realism?) serves Pynchon's purpose, it can serve an audience's purpose as well. In a desensitized era when an unfaithful Bill Clinton claims not to inhale, more conservative citizens might long nostalgically for that Age of Reason when purity supposedly prevailed and George Washington, to uphold the moral life, confessed to chopping down the cherry tree. Yet Pynchon rejects such an idealization, portraying instead the revered father of our country as a dope-smoking, munchy-scarfing, slaveholding homebody .
One might speculate, however, that Pynchon does not mean to discredit either Washington or drug use. Thus, "[i)n this Province of the Unreflective, if the Colonel serves not as a Focus of Sobriety, neither is he quite the incompetent Fool depicted in the London press" (275) . Nevertheless, in Pynchon's world, idealized or mythic images of saintly or immortal predecessors exist only as figments of the national imagination. By portraying Washington as involved with drugs, Franklin and "that Lot" as greedy, power-hungry opportunists, genocide, Westward expansion and slavery, Pynchon rewrites history in terms that are perhaps more realistic and more rational because not over rationalized. Indeed, one cannot rationalize such things, though many versions of history have tried to: Revolutionary leaders were righteous and without serious fault; Indians had to be eliminated because they hindered national expansion; slavery was essential for our country to become the economic power it was destined to become. In short, the virtue of America's volition, in such instances, has served the pursuit of an imaginary good will. But none of these rationalizations makes sense, especially when based on inaccurate and uncritical representations of history. History relies on fiction, to be sure, and Pynchon's fiction rewrites history, hilariously yet profoundly.
Dispelling such romantic notions about the Age of Reason as that coffeehouses were loci of rational discourse and that leaders were wholly virtuous allows Pynchon to shift his focus to that other site of irascible public gathering, the tavern. Composing and consuming bad history (rationalizing what has no rational end-the purely irrational) makes the evils America commits appear necessary. If our righteous leaders (political and otherwise) condone atrocities, then such things as genocide, slavery and war cannot be evil, can they? America must have used (and still uses) such means to achieve an American ideal-an American good-set forth by our forefathers. In short, bad history makes us feel good about our Bad History.
Mason, again flippantly, claims that '"the Provinces are alike as Stacy and Tracy,"' to which Dixon astutely replies, '" Except for the Negro Slavery upon one side [. .. ] and not the other'" (6 15). Captain Zhang then continues, Hence the Line becomes a metaphor for the tens!on Pynchon continually highlights: One may rationalize in America, but the very idea of the Line suggests irrational rationality. It embodies at once an evil, for the South will continue the practice of enslavement, and a good, for the North will provide a somewhat safe haven for some escaped slaves. But working-class Americans will also become virtual slaves to a capitalism that sees the divide between the rich and the working poor growing larger with each passing day. Mason and Dixon are complicit in this divide, although neither is a bad person. Yet something else seems to be at work here too . Whereas Mason lapses into moments of irrationality (or misology) , Dixon, in adhering to rationality, comes close to making a choice that will both stem and depart from his ability to reason. The two, moreover, appear to exemplify Kant's definition of good will. Together they form a conduit that produces for Dixon a chance for action.
Mason and Dixon may recognize this divide, perhaps because of their familiarity with what Habermas identifies as Great Britain's model public sphere, which involves free speech, free human beings and freedom for property owners to have protection and equality. However, Mason and Dixon keep encountering the opposites in America: guarded speech, slavery, and indigenous property owners (Indians) with no protection or equality. Indeed, Pynchon suggests, except for the powerful and the wealthy, nobody enjoys these three freedoms in a pure sense. Again, America defies rationality.
Having finished the Line, Mason and Dixon (now in Delaware, "Tavern-crawling" [687)) come to terms with their adventures and reach conclusions about the public sphere. What is said of Dixon's surveyor's personal North-Point, "representative of his Honesty and Good Name, " applies ironically to the reality of America by which Dixon has long been frustrated: "an often enormous Investment of Faith, and Will, lies condens'd within, giving it a Potency in the World that the Agents of Reason care little for" (688). Religious faith and stubborn will combine to make America incapable of idealized rational discourse, for it remains too committed to its arguments for irrational acts: slavery has practical benefits; Indians need religion and civilization (but they will be eradicated anyway); religion and government must coincide; and, two centuries later, America needs to fight in Vietnam and in Iraq. But whereas Mason descends ever further into melancholy, the fiery Dixon lets his emotions take over in a Kantian pursuit of good will. Dixon asks an oblivious Mason, "'Ev'rywhere they've sent us,- Dixon discovers at this moment the very irrational rationality of having made the Line-and of the Line itself. Taking matters into his own hands, he exhibits a bravery that seems honorable and right compared to the way most Americans (and even Mason) act toward Indians and slaves with indifference at best. While in Maryland, Mason and Dixon attend an auction whose "goods" include horses, tobacco and slaves . Dixon confronts a slave driver who is beating his slaves, takes his whip, punches the man in the mouth, breaks his tooth, and tells him, "'I'm going to kill you ... ? Now be a man, face me, and make it easier, or must I rather work upon you from the Back, like a Beast, which will take longer, and certainly mean more discomfort for For Dixon, violence is a means to the end of Kantian good will, and serves as a possible way to redefine the rational as that which (at least in America) relies as much on the irrational to be effective. In this case, Pynchon suggests, passion and emotion guide us as much as (or perhaps more than) reason. Dixon cannot stop the legal practice of slavery, nor will he even stop this particular slave owner.
15 But his irrational means -a violent act -serves his rational pursuit of an internal good end, if only because it sets a good example and allows him to express his views on slavery. He temporarily stops the local abuse, but more important for him, he answers the call of his own inner demons that decry this inhuman practice. Kant acknowledges the problems inherent in championing reason as a goal: "we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will" ( 10). Dixon knows that his actions will not effect monumental change, that his good will is not good "because of what it performs or effects."
Moreover, if the seeming opposites of reason-passion and emotion -grip Dixon in this incident, then this passion and emotion exist in Pynchon's America not as opposites to reason but as necessary components of reason -conditions of its very existence. Dixon's passion and emotion in performing this act of goodness at once defy the notion of reason, even as he follows Kant's "practical imperative": "to treat humanity, wh ether in thin e own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (4 7). Dixon does not use violence only for the sake of violence; his desired ends remain equivalent to good will. And the irrational rationality of his outburst gives insight into Pynchon's worldview: passion and reason are necessarily complementary, as, perhaps, are the irrational and the rational. Acts of pure reason sans passion most often lead, as America's sordid history demonstrates, to cruelty and despair. Furthermore, Dixon's action in this case reveals both the good and the bad that are the Line, the two forever linked, good will preventing bad from winning out -the same good will put to the test some one hundred years later in the good/bad dichotomy of the Civil War.
Shortly after this incident, Mason and Dixon part ways, their job complete. What Pynchon suggests they have learned contributes uniquely to our history. The exploits of these two men, a pair of protagonists only in Pynchon's world, give readers a glimpse into what might actually have happened in the Age of Reason. An astronomer and a surveyor come to realize that rational discourse in America justifies an unusual degree of reliance on religion yet condones slavery, Indian eradication and Westward expansion at any cost-all of which involve human suffering at levels that will forever remain beyond any rational comprehension. For these two men, the realm of purest reason, "pure Mathesis" (134), lies beyond the earth, in the stars they use to map the Line. Rational discourse? Age of Reason? We might laugh at the yearning for such ideals. Pynchon does too. But in this laughter a sharp pain surfaces. The period we have labeled the Age of Reason was not as we have so often romantically imagined it; rather, it needs continual problematizing for our understanding of it to become more ... reasonable.
Toward the Twentieth Century
Schudson suggests that the oft-idealized public sphere rich with rational discourse never existed: "It does not appear that in any general sense rational-critical discussion characterized American politics in the colonial era " (160). By taking us over two centuries into the past, Pynchon suggests that the absurdity of the twentieth century actually makes more sense if we recognize that the Age of Reason replete with rational discourse never happened -that we have yet to experience a truly enlightened era of rational discourse. He elaborates by suggesting that, then and now, rational discourse depends on the irrational as much as it does on the purely rational. An Age of Reason has happened, just not as we have imagined it.
As Habermas writes about the British model of the public sphere, "this constitutional state came with one crucial drawback: publicness became the organizational principle for the procedures of the organs of the state themselves" (83) . Writing about the turn of the nineteenth century, Habermas concludes that when public opinion becomes neutral in regard to the public and private spheres-neutral to "reasonable communication" and "irrational conformity" -public administration becomes the norm, and the state becomes practically impervious to the people's voice (242-43). About this "structural transformation" Habermas writes, " [The] ability to assume [the bourgeois public sphere's proper function] determines whether the exercise of domination and power persists as a negative constant ... of history or whether as a historical category itself, it is open to substantive change" (250).
America saw (and continues to see) domination and power as negative constants. Mason & Dixon grounds us in the past and, with its foreshadowing and references to contemporary culture, takes us to the present. Cherrycoke comments on religion and power, "'The New Religion had crested better than twenty years before [ ... ] by the 'sixties we were well into a Descent, that grew more vertiginous with the days, ever toward some great Trough whose terrible Depth no one knew" '; and other comments concerning "the University man," "'an Awakening,"' and "'a Revolution"' (261) When Mason tells Johnson and Boswell that he has "'ascended, descended, even condescended, and the List's not ended,-but haven't yet trans-cended a blessed thing'" (746), Pynchon may be commenting on behalf of those Americans struggling to figure out the very essence of America in relation to anything rational. Mason has yet to figure it out: he (unlike Dixon) and we have yet to embrace the uniting of rational and irrational. Of Mason's death Pynchon writes, '"tis possible, after all, down here, to die of Melancholy" (762). In his melancholy, Mason recognizes that There may be found, within the malodorous Grotto of the Selves, a conscious Denial of all that Reason holds true. Something that knows, unarguably as it knows Flesh is sooner or later Meat, that there are Beings who are not wise, or spiritually advanced, or indeed capable of Human kindness, but ever and implacably cruel, hiding, haunting, waiting. (769) Is Mason ultimately a misologist? Overall, perhaps not, assuming he (and of course Dixon) learns that hating and shunning reason, and favoring and embracing reason are forever linked, forming the necessary bond between the irrational and the rational. The novel offers the Kantian suggestion that we are given to emotion and reason, and cannot function without both of them working together-that reason alone cannot be "the governor of our will. " Is a post-Age-of-Reason America only a fiction, a false hope to be abandoned, a never-to-be realized goal, or a dream to which we can continue to aspire? Realizing such a goal (if we can do so) depends on our willingness to unite the rational and the irrational, reason and passion/emotion. And who better than Mason and Dixon -looking toward the stars to cognitively map the earth-to take us to the Age of Reason's supposed crux, to reveal the very nature of reason's, and America's, history? These possibilities grace the pages of this complex homage to two unlikely sources of inspiration. Through Mason and Dixon's disillusionment in America, readers can seek enlightenment. The novel reminds us that we are neither first nor last to wonder what became, and perhaps what will become, of the magic of America, burdened by a history that bears the label "rational" when reality demands that we look beyond the rational to locate and problematize what we are really about: the irrational. From the shore they will hear Milkmaids quarreling and cowbells a clank, and dogs, and Babies old and new, -Hammers upon Nails, Wives upon Husbands, the ring of Pot-lids, the jingling of Draft-chains, a rifle-shot from a stretch of woods, lengthily crackling tree to tree and across the water. ... An animal will come to a Headland, and stand, regarding them with narrowly set Eyes that glow a Moment. Its Face slowly turning as they pass. America. (257-58) 13 Pynchon did not discover drug use in American history: the rampant use of opium in early America is well known. Pynchon connects then and now, affording us a hilarious look at our forefathers, who we might believe could not possibly have used drugs. See Pynchon's introduction to Slo w Learner: "I was hugely tickled by all forms of marijuana humor, though the talk back then [in the 1950s) was in inverse relation to the availability of that useful substance" (8).
14 Eliminating evolution from public-school science curricula and posting the Ten Commandments in public schools are two examples. 
